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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
AIRPORT SECURITY SYSTEMS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The first skyjacking of a commercial airliner within the United
States occurred in 1961. As a result of more than 150 successful hi-
jackings' of domestic flights in the next eleven years, a massive na-
tional airport security system was instituted.2 The security procedure
has undergone substantial metamorphosis since its inception in 1972.
Presently, all passengers are required to undergo an inspection proce-
dure prior to boarding the aircraft. Typically, a passenger is required
to empty the contents of his pockets into a transparent plastic bag
which, together with his carry-on baggage, is visually inspected. He
is then required to pass through a metal detection device (magnetom-
eter) commonly situated in a portal. Should he activate the magne-
tometer, he is usually allowed a second test after removing any metal
object inadvertently left on his person. Should the magnetometer
again register a positive reading, he is required to produce
identification and an explanation; should either be unsatisfactory, a
more thorough and intrusive search may be conducted.'
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by the fourth amendment is enforced by an exclusionary
rule which bars from use in a subsequent criminal prosecution evi-
dence obtained in violation of the amendment.' There can be no
doubt that the security procedure currently being employed consti-
tutes a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The
United States Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,5 demon-
strated that the fourth amendment protects not merely property
rights, but personal privacy, and that such privacy could be invaded
by electronic means.'
The amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to
1. An excellent summary of these events can be found in McGinley & Downs,
Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FoRD L. REV. 293 (1972).
2. For law review commentary on the skyjacking problem see Abramovsky, The
Constitutionality of the Anti-Hijacking Security System, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 123
(1972); McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach,
41 FORD L. REV. 293 (1972); Wright, Hijacking Risks and Airport Frisks: Reconciling
Airline Security with the Fourth Amendment, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 491 (1973); Comment,
71 COLUM. L. REv. 1039 (1971); Note, 39 TENN. L. Rlv. 354 (1972).
3. See Wright, Hijacking Risks and Airport Frisks: Reconciling Airline Security
with the Fourth Amendment, 9 CRIM. L. BuLL. 491 (1973).
4. The exclusionary rule applies to both federal and state courts. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6. Technological subtleties regarding the nature of the magnetometer as an en-
tirely passive instrument emitting no radiation or other emanation are entirely irrele-
vant.
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be a restriction on governmental power7 rather than that of private
individuals'; thus any application of the fourth amendment to an
airport security system must be predicated on a showing of "state
action." The specter of the federal government in the airline industry
is undeniable and ubiquitous. The fact that an airline is a public
carrier regulated by the federal government may, by itself, be suffi-
cient to warrant application of the fourth amendment'; but, in addi-
tion, a federal charter is a prerequisite to airline operation, tariffs and
flight paths are prescribed, and airline policy is subject to F.A.A. and
C.A.B. approval. Similarly, the imposition of airline security mea-
sures by federal statute'0 and regulation" should suffice to justify
application of the constitutional prohibition.12
A strong argument for the application of the fourth amendment
to the airport search can be made by analogy to Supreme Court
decisions in the area of racial discrimination. In Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority," the Court found sufficient state action to
warrant application of the fourteenth amendment in the placing of
state "power, property, and prestige behind the admitted discrimina-
tion"' in the leasing of a public building to a racially discriminatory
restaurant. The significance of this decision lies in the fact that most
airlines lease space in public airports which are owned and operated
by state or federal agencies. Further, in Shelley v. Kraemer5 state
7. "[I]ts protection applies to government action. Its origin and history clearly
show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and
was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies ....
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
8. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d
306, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968); Barnes v. United States,
373 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); United States v. Blum, 329 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
9. See Public Util. Comm. v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
10. See 49 U.S.C. §1511 (1970).
11. See 14 C.F.R. §121.538 (1972).
12. The Ninth Circuit has held fruits of a search conducted by airline officials
solely in enforcement of a federal statute inadmissible when the search fails to meet
the fourth amendment standards. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1966). The court concluded that such a search "was in substance a federal search cast
in the form of a carrier inspection to enable the officers to avoid the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 5. See also Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310,
316-17 (1927); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967). The Second Circuit
has explicitly rejected the Corngold rationale. See United States v. Blum, 329 F.2d 49
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004,
1010 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
13. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
14. Id. at 725.
15. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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action was found in judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive cove-
nant. Thus, even should the airport search be regarded as the action
of a private entity, employment in an ensuing criminal prosecution
of the fruits of such a search might invoke the fourth amendment
prohibitions."
The fourth amendment contains two clauses, the warrant clause
and the reasonableness clause. The exact relationship between these
two clauses has been a subject of some controversy, the traditional
view being that the clauses are complementary; that is, searches
conducted without warrants are per se unreasonable except under
narrowly prescribed circumstances. 7 Although there has been the
development of limited exceptions to the warrant requirement, prob-
able cause' has generally been a necessary ingredient of a constitu-
tionally permissible search, whether conducted with or without a
warrant." The probable cause concept is an elastic one but there are
certain appurtenances to the formula about which there can be no
doubt; more than mere suspicion 6 or good faith' on the part of the
16. A more esoteric justification has been proposed by Professor Adolph Berle,
suggesting that, under certain circumstances, corporations should be directly subject
to constitutional mandates irrespective of governmental involvement. See Berle,
Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from
Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952).
17. "[Elxcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant." Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
"[Slearches conducted outside the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)(Footnotes
omitted.)
18. The generally accepted definition of probable cause was given in Stacey v.
Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) and quoted in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
161 (1925): "If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a
man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is
sufficient." Probable cause is the most commonly used term, but the Supreme Court
has indicated that substantially similar terms have the same meaning. See Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 25 (1963)(reasonable belief); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 478 n.6 (1963)(reasonable grounds). The standard is the same for state and
federal activities. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23 (1963).
19. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963)(mere suspicion); Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959)(strong reason to suspect).
21. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
(1959).
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investigating officer is exacted. In the light of these requirements it
is patent that an indiscriminate search of all who wish to travel by
air falls far short of the probable cause standard and that no valid
warrant could be issued.
However, certain exceptions to the warrant requirement have
developed: searches incident to arrest 2 or in "hot pursuit"23 ; evidence
discovered in plain view24 ; searches conducted with the consent of the
suspect 25; and those under exigent circumstances. 2' Typical airport
security measures can hardly be justified as searches incident to ar-
rest, since no arrest is made until the search has been completed and
contraband discovered.2 7 However, should a passenger be singled out
by the magnetometer and fail to properly identify himself or provide
a satisfactory explanation, it is arguable that an arrest occurs at this
point since rarely would airport officials permit such an individual to
walk freely away, and that a subsequent search might thus qualify
as a search incident to arrest. Such an argument, however, disregards
the fact that the exception is predicated on the existence of a valid
arrest based on probable cause.2 9 Clearly, the requisite probable cause
element cannot be furnished retrospectively by evidence unearthed
in a post-arrest search."
That a search conducted with the consent of the subject is an
exception to both the warrant and probable cause requirements is
well established.3 A passenger's consent to be searched might con-
22. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
23. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
24. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
36-37 (1963).
25. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
26. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
27. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
28. Arrest is customarily defined as the taking of a person into custody. Character-
istically, there is a requirement of some actual restraint of the person (i.e., that mere
words are insufficient) or submission by the person to the custody of the arresting
officer. Nevertheless, for purposes of the Miranda requirements, Chief Justice Warren
has defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). (Em-
phasis added.)
29. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
30. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356 (1931).
31. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
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ceivably be gleaned from his undertaking to board an airliner in the
face of widespread public awareness of the existence of airport secu-
rity measures and conspicuously posted signs advising that all pas-
sengers and baggage are subject to search. Traditionally, however, a
consensual search must be based on the individual's unequivocal and
specific consent, voluntarily and intelligently given, unadulterated
by any innuendo of constraint"2 ; and such stringent requirements
would hardly permit an inference of a passenger's consent from his
attempting to board a commercial airliner. In addition, under the
doctrine of implied coercion, acquiescence to apparent lawful author-
ity or consent given in impliedly coercive circumstances is invalid
and evidence unearthed in such a search inadmissible. 33 Conceding
that an officer's mere presence does not invalidate consent, 34 a re-
quest that a passenger submit to a search, when made by an airport
security official, appears to be cloaked in the mantle of lawful author-
ity.
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte3. may have undermined the cornerstones
of the traditional consent search edifice .3 The Court confronted the
question of what indicia of voluntariness will support a valid consent
search, indicating that voluntariness is a question of fact to be deter-
mined from all the circumstances.3 7 More specifically, the Court de-
cided that an individual need not be apprised of his right to refuse
consent,:" and that proof of his subjective knowledge of his right to
refuse consent is not an indispensable ingredient of a valid consent
search." The doctrine of implied coercion seems unimpaired by
30, 35 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 358 (1967); Zap v. United States,
328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
32. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,548 (1969); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); United States v.
Smith, 308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir.
1962).
33. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543.(1968); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
34. See United States v. Rutheiser, 203 F. Supp. 891, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
35. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
36. The word "may" is used advisedly. Although Schneckloth reflects an alarm-
ingly severe departure from the traditional fabric of the consent search, the Court was
far from unanimous. The opinion was written by Justice Stewart. Justice Blackmun
filed a concurring opinion as did Justice Powell (in whose opinion Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist joined). There were three dissenting opinions (Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall). In addition Justice Stewart described his holding as a narrow
one. Id. at 248.
37. Id. at 248-49.
38. Id. at 229-30.
39. Id. at 234.
[Vol. 34
NO TES
Schneckloth, but the full import of the case can only be clarified by
subsequent decisions.
Although not specifically provided for in the constitution, free-
dom to travel has long been recognized as a fundamental right.40
Quite obviously, a passenger is not compelled to travel by air, but in
many situations there is no realistic alternative; therefore, may pas-
sage on a commercial airliner be conditioned on a waiver of the fourth
amendment? Although, as a general rule, a privilege may be con-
ferred contingently, such a procedure is constitutionally infirm if the
suspensive condition is the renunciation of a federal constitutional
right.4' Thus predicating the exercise of the constitutionally guaran-
teed right to travel on relinquishment of the right to privacy cannot
be sustained.
The other theory concerning the relationship between the war-
rant and reasonableness clauses of the fourth amendment is that the
clauses are severable; that is, warrantless searches need only be
judged by the standard of reasonableness. Support for this view can
be found in Terry v. Ohio.4" In upholding the validity of a limited
search for weapons conducted without a warrant and in the absence
of probable cause, the Supreme Court declared that "what the Con-
stitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures. '4 3 Reasonableness, however, was predicated on
the existence of certain objective articulated criteria. An indiscrimi-
nate search of all passengers can scarcely be justified under this stop
and frisk rationale. Considering the type of individual who has the
inclination and financial resources to fly, such a search could be
based on nothing more than inchoate and unparticularized suspi-
40. Although there have been some differences of opinion as to the sources of the
right to travel, it has been firmly established as fundamental. The right has been held
to derive from the privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause, the com-
merce clause, and general constitutional principles. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 180-86 (1941); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
41. It has been declared unconstitutional to condition an assertion of a fourth
amendment right on a waiver of the fifth amendment. Cf. Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968). Also it is unconstitutional to condition other benefits on surrender
of constitutional guarantees. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assis-
tance benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(unemployment compensa-
tion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (tax exemptions); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (public employment).
42. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
43. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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cions, grounds unequivocally condemned in Terry." Terry and its
companion cases do, however, suggest what, when analogized to an-
other species of search, may be the utlimate rationale under which
the airport security system might be justified.
Border searches" have always been exempt from the probable
cause requirement of the fourth amendment. 6 Any customs official
may stop and search any vehicle, beast, or person arriving in the
United States on which or on whom he suspects there is contraband. 7
Additionally, customs officials are authorized to search any vehicle
or vessel at any place in the United States, and to use all necessary
force to compel compliance." Furthermore, immigration officials are
authorized to conduct searches for illegally entered aliens within a
reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United
States.49 These searches without probable cause have been justified
as historical aberrations because the Act which sanctioned them was
enacted by the same Congress which proposed the Bill of Rights.
Thus, it is said, they were intended to be outside the prohibition of
the fourth amendment.50 Yet it is well established that more than
mere suspicion is required to sustain border searches entailing seri-
ously intrusive invasions." It appears, therefore, that the explanation
underlying the border search exception does not lie in a vague notion
of contemporaneity with the passage of the fourth amendment, but
in the fact that such searches, in light of the conditions under which
they must be made, meet the reasonableness test.
This same justification may grant constitutional validity to the
airport security system. The possibility posed by the skyjacking
phenomenon of disaster and loss of life of catastrophic proportions
44. 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
45. For more detailed information on border searches see Comment, 10 ARIz. L.
REV. 457 (1968); Comment, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 871 (1968); Comment, 77 YALE L.J.
1007 (1968).
46. See Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967); Alexander v.
United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
48. Id. § 1581(a) (1970).
49. Id. § 1357(a) (1970).
50. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
51. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33-34. (1963)(for the proposition that spe-
cial problems of enforcement should be given weight in determining the reasonableness
of a search). For cases in which, because of the seriousness of the invasion of privacy,
the courts have required something more than mere suspicion to sustain a border
search, see United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970); Henderson
v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d
870 (9th Cir. 1966).
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and the magnitude of the task of prevention seem to justify the rather
inoffensive intrusion which the search procedure entails. An individ-
ual attempting to board an airliner should be aware that a search will
be made, and since the relatively non-intrusive personal search at the
airport is indiscriminately administered to a class of persons (who are
not stigmatized by the classification), such searches arguably lack
the quality of insult felt by an individual singled out for an intrusive
search. The Supreme Court has said, "[t]here is no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure)
entails."52 However, such a search becomes constitutionally imper-
missible when it exceeds the limits of reasonableness. The relatively
minor intrusion, warranted by the danger of air piracy, would seem
to exceed its permissible limits when the object of the search is some-
thing other than a weapon or other instrumentality which might be
employed to commandeer an airplane.
The great majority of arrests arising from the anti-hijacking se-
curity system have been unrelated to the skyjacking problem: arrests
for possession of narcotics outnumber those for possession of weapons
by a ratio of more than two to one and more than one-third of the
total arrests involve charges of illegal entry, parole violation, flight
to avoid prosecution, and absence without leave from the armed serv-
ices. ' Admittedly, in a normal search situation, an officer legally
searching for materials concerning one crime may validly seize evi-
dence of a different offense which he happens upon; 4 but such
searches already possess independent grounds for their validity,
whereas the airport search is justified only by its reasonableness in
light of its avowed purpose. The United States Supreme Court, in
Sibron v. New York,5 refused to condone a self-protective search for
weapons where the circumstances failed to support a reasonable in-
ference that the person searched was armed and dangerous. If the
airport security system is to maintain its validity, the principle es-
poused in this decision must be applied with vigor and determination
and the airport security system should be firmly re-directed to the
accomplishment of the end for which it was created.
Herbert J. Mang, Jr.
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
53. See NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 24, 1972, § 4, at 2, col. 1; NEW YORK TIMES, Nov.
26, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
54. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947), overruled on other grounds, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Klor v.
Hannon, 278 F. Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
55. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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